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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TODD FLEMAL, : 
Petitioner, : 
v. : 
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, CHAD : Case No. 20110022-CA 
EWING, d.b.a. ITALIAN DRYWALL, and 
UNINSURED EMPLOYERS'FUND, : 
Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(a) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Mr. Flemal was injured on April 16, 2007. Flemal had been employed by Chad 
Ewing (d.b.a. Italian Drywall). The only disputed issue before the Utah Labor 
Commission was whether Flemal's employment had been terminated before he was 
injured. R. 145. The Commission determined that Ewing had terminated Flemal's 
employment before Flemal was injured. Is the Commission's determination supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the record as a whole? 
1 
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ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW and STANDARD OF REVIEW: An agency's 
determination of fact will be overturned on appeal only if the petitioner has been 
substantially prejudiced and the determination is not "supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-
403(4)(g) (West 2009). "Substantial evidence exists when the factual findings support 
more than a mere scintilla of evidence . . . though something less than the weight of the 
evidence." Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus. 2007 UT 42, f 35, 164 P.3d 384 (internal -
citation and quotation marks omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
All such provisions are set forth verbatim in Addendum A to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 12, 2009, Flemal filed an application for hearing with the Commission. 
R. 1-8. Flemal sought workers5 compensation benefits for an injury that he claimed 
occurred while he was working for Chad Ewing. R. 1. The Uninsured Employers' Fund 
contested Flemal's claim that his injury arose in the course and scope of his employment. 
R. 12. At the evidentiary hearing, Ewing and Nicholas Bassett testified that Flemal had 
been fired before the injury, and had been told not to perform any more work. R. 162 at 
49-54, 58-65. The Administrative Law Judge held that Flemal was employed at the time 
of his injury because Ewing had failed to adequately fire him. "The preponderance of the 
evidence shows that Ewing attempted to terminate the Petitioner on the morning of April 
16, 2007. Unfortunately he failed to escort the Petitioner off the premises." R. 77. 
2 
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The Commission reversed the ALJ's decision, making a determination of fact that 
Ewing had terminated Flemal's employment before Petitioner's injury. R. 158.1 Based in 
part on this determination, the Commission held that Flemal was not acting in the course 
of employment at the time of his injury. The Commission therefore denied Flemal's 
claim for benefits. R. 158-59. Flemal filed a timely petition for judicial review with this 
C o u r t . • • • • • • • • • ' ; ••''••:^: 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Todd Flemal was employed by Chad Ewing to perform cleanup on job sites. R. 
162 at 56. On April 16,2007, Mr. Ewing fired Flemal for bringing drugs to the job site. 
Id. at 58-59. Both Ewing and Bassett testified that Flemal was fired and told not to do 
anymore work, but to wait until Ewing could give him a ride home. Id. at 49-54, 58-65. 
Bassett testified that Flemal was acting contrary to these instructions when he was 
injured. Id. at 50, 54. Flemal testified that he had not been fired. Id. at 24-25; 
The only issue Flemal raised before the Commission was whether he had been 
fired before he was injured. R. 145. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sole issue presented to the Commission was whether Flemal was employed by 
Chad Ewing at the time he was injured. R. 145. The Commission reviewed the testimony 
of Flemal, Ewing, and Bassett. It concluded that Bassett's testimony was the most 
1
 The record contains an unnumbered page before page 158. That page is relevant 
as well. 
3 
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persuasive. R. 158. Weighing the evidence, the Commission made a determination of 
fact that Flemal had been fired and told not to perform anymore work prior to his injury. 
R. 158-59. 
There is substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's 
determination. Adopting an erroneous standard of review, Flemal argues that any doubt 
as to coverage should be resolved in favor of the injured worker. Seeking to place the 
burden of proof on the respondents to show the correctness of the Commission's decision, 
Flemal also fails to argue that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the 
Commission's determination of fact. The Commission's decision should be affirmed on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE 
COMMISSION'S FINDING OF FACT THAT FLEMAL'S 
EMPLOYMENT WAS TERMINATED BEFORE HIS ACCIDENT 
Flemal asks this Court to use the wrong standard of review in considering his 
challenge to the Commission's factual findings. Br. of Petitioner 9-16. Utah's 
Administrative Procedures Act states: 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the following:... 
the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
4 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4)(g) (West 2009). See also Sierra Club v. Utah Air 
Quality Bd., 2006 UT 74, f 9, 148 P.3d 960. 
The Commission determined that Flemal was not employed by Ewing at the time 
of his injury; that Flemal had been fired. Flemal doesn't claim that there is no substantial 
evidence in the record to support the Commission's determination. Instead; he asks this 
Court to use two other standards of review. First, Flemal claims that any doubts as to 
coverage should be resolved in favor of the injured worker. Br. of Petitioner at 9-11. His 
only support for this claim is a series of cases stating that Utah's Workers' Compensation 
Act should be liberally construed, id. at 9-10, however none use the standard of review 
for factual determinations urged by Flemal. Indeed, in one of the cases Flemal cites, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that it would "affirm the Commission on contradictory 
evidence, if there is substantial competent evidence to sustain it." Baker v. Indus, 
Comm'n, 405 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1965), abandoned in unrelated part, Allen v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Notably in Baker, the Court did not reject the 
Commission's factual determination because all doubts should be resolved in favor of the 
injured worker, but because there was no substantial evidence in the record to support the 
challenged determination of fact. Id. at 614-15. 
And in Crafts v. Labor Commission, 2005 UT App 238,2 this Court used the 
substantial evidence standard to review a challenge to the Commission's determinations 
2
 Unpublished decisions of this Court are binding precedential authority. Grand 
County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25, T[16,, 44 P.3d 734. Seealso Utah R. App. P. 30(f). 
5 
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of fact. Id at *1 . Further, this Court held that the petitioner was not relieved of his 
burden to prove his injuries were covered by the Workers' Compensation Act by the 
requirement that the act be liberally construed in favor of finding coverage when the 
statutory terms reasonably permit such an interpretation. Id. * 
To further deflect this Court's attention, Flemal also tries 
proof on the respondents. Br. of Petitioner at 11-16. Without any citation to authority, 
petitioner asks this Court to, de novo, assess the credibility of the witnesses. It is not this 
Court's "prerogative on review to reweigh the evidence." VanLeeuwen v. Indus. 
Comm'n. 901 P.2d28L 284 (Utah App 1995). Instead the reviewing court gives 
deference to the factual determinations of administrative bodies. The Commission's 
factual findings should be upheld if there is more than a mere scintilla of evidence that 
supports them in the record. • ; 
Substantial evidence exists when the factual findings support "more than a 
mere scintilla of evidence . . . though something less than the weight of the 
evidence." An administrative law decision meets the substantial evidence 
test when "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate" the evidence 
supporting the decision, 
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus. 2007 UT 42, f35, 164 P.3d 384 (citation omitted). 
The only issue on appeal is the correctness of the Commission's fact 
determinations that Flemal was fired before his injury. That Flemal had been told not to 
perform any more work. The testimony of Chad Ewing and Nicholas Bassett supports 
these fact determinations. Their testimony was that Flemal was fired before his injury. 
Petitioner has failed to show that the Commission's determinations of fact are 
6 -.. 
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unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.3 The final agency action should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Uninsured Employers' Fund asks this Court to 
affirm the final agency action. 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 2011. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Uninsured Employers' Fund 
3
 The Uninsured Employers' Fund joins in Respondent Chad Ewing's argument 
that Flemal failed to marshal all of the evidence that supports the Commission's 
determinations of fact. Br. of Respondent Chad Ewing at 7-8. The Commission's 
decision should be affirmed for this additional reason. 
7 
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Determinative Statutes and Rules 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (West 2009) 
Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency action with the 
appropriate appellate court in the form required by the appellate rules of the appropriate 
appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern all additional 
filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial review of 
formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and copies for the 
record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to shorten, summarize, or 
organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has 
failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-making 
body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency 
by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; 
or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION 
TODD FLEMAL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
CHAD EWING, d.b.a. ITALIAN 
DRYWALL, and UNINSURED 
EMPLOYERS FUND, 
Respondents. 
ORDER REVERSING 
ALJ'S DECISION AND 
DENYING BENEFITS 
Case No. 09-0026 
Chad Ewing, a sole proprietor doing business as Italian Drywall, and the Uninsured 
Employers Fund ("UEF") ask the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge 
Marlowe's award of benefits to Todd Flemal under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, Title 34A, 
Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to § 63 G-
4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and § 34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. -
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Mr. Flemal claims benefits for left-hand injuries resulting from an accident on April 16, 
2007. According to Mr. Flemal, the accident occurred while he was working for Mr. Ewing, but Mr. 
Ewing asserts he had terminated Mr. Flemal's employment prior to the accident. 
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Marlowe concluded that an employment relationship 
continued to exist between Mr. Ewing and Mr. Flemal at the time of the April 16 accident and that 
Mr. Flemal's injuries arose out of and in the course of that employment. Judge Marlowe therefore 
ordered Mr. Ewing and the UEF1 to pay workers' compensation benefits to Mr. Flemal. 
Mr. Ewing's motion for review of Judge Marlowe's decision reiterates that Mr. Flemal was 
not Mr. Ewing's employee when the April 16 accident occurred; consequently, Mr. Flemal's injuries 
did not arise in the course of employment. Mr. Ewing also argues that, even if there was an 
employment relationship, the actions leading to the accident were outside the scope of Mr. Flemal's 
employment. Finally, Mr. Ewing contends the evidence does not support Judge Marlowe's 
determination of Mr. Flemal's compensation rate. The UEF joins in Mr. Ewing's arguments. 
1
 Pursuant to § 34A-2-704 (1) (a) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, the UEF assists in 
paying worker's compensation benefits to injured workers whose employers are uninsured and 
insolvent, r 
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PAGE 2 OF 5 
SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT 
Some of the material facts regarding Mr. Flemal's employment and accident are undisputed. 
On approximately March 1, 2007, Mr. Ewing, a dry wall contractor, hired Mr. Flemal as a helper. 
Mr. Ewing paid Mr. Flemal in cash, without withholding any taxes or providing any wage statement 
or other documentation. Mr. Ewing also failed to maintain workers' compensation insurance 
coverage for his employees. 
Because Mr. Flemal did not have a car, Mr. Ewing drove him to and from the various work 
sites. On the morning of April 16, 2007, Mr. Ewing drove Mr. Flemal to a dry wall project in 
Syracuse, Utah. Mr. Bassett, another of Mr. Ewing's employees, was also working at the site. That 
day, as Mr. Flemal was standing on a crate to finish the basement ceiling, the crate gave way. Mr. 
Flemal fell and a 114 inch screw lodged in left hand. 
While the foregoing facts are not in dispute, other relevant facts are sharply disputed. 
Mr. Ewing testified that after he and Mr. Flemal arrived at the job site, he observed Mr. 
Flemal with a hypodermic needle containing a substance Mr. Ewing believed to be a drug. Based on 
this observation, Mr. Ewing told Mr. Flemal "he wasn't needed anymore." Mr. Ewing then left Mr. 
Flemal at the job site because Mr. Ewing had to pick his children up from school. 
Mr. Bassett, the other employee present at the accident scene, corroborates Mr. Ewing's 
statements. Mr. Bassett heard Mr. Ewing tell Mr. Flemal that his help wasn't needed anymore; that 
Mr. Flemal was not to perform any work; and that he would take Mr. Flemal home after he picked 
his children up. Mr. Bassett testified that after Mr. Ewing left the work site, Mr. Flemal said "since 
I'm here I'm going to sweep." Later, Mr. Bassett saw Mr. Flemal standing on the crate to work on 
the ceiling, and then fall from the crate. 
Mr. Flemal tells a different story. He denies that Mr. Ewing terminated his employment or 
told him not to do any work on April 16. To the contrary, Mr. Flemal testified that, after he and Mr. 
Ewing arrived at the Syracuse job site on April 16, Mr. Ewing assigned various tasks to him. Mr. 
Flemal was in the process of performing his work when he fell from the crate and injured his hand. 
Mr. Flemal denied possessing a hypodermic needle at work that day. However, he was equivocal 
about his actual use of drugs that day and he admitted intravenous methamphetamine use and 
marijuana use before and after the day of the accident. 
Mr. Flemal's version of events cannot be reconciled with the testimony of Mr. Ewing and Mr. 
Bassett. In considering which, if either, version is true, the Commission notes that both Mr. Flemal 
and Mr. Ewing have a financial interest in the outcome of this matter. Mr. Flemal's credibility is 
diminished by his admitted drug use and his unconvincing testimony regarding his use of drugs on 
the day in question. Mr. Ewing's credibility is diminished by his failure to comply with several '-state 
and federal tax and employment laws—in particular, his failures to document payment of wages, 
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maintain workers' compensation coverage, or withhold payroll taxes. Additionally, the fact that Mr. 
Ewing allowed Mr. Flemal to remain on the work site after his purported firing suggests that Mr. 
Flemal was never fired at all. However, that inference is rebutted by Mr. Ewing's explanation of his 
need to pick up his children from school before he could take Mr. Flemal home. 
While the testimony of Mr. Flemal and Mr. Ewing is subject to doubt, Mr. Bassett's 
testimony is more persuasive. He has no direct personal interest in this matter. His testimony was 
direct and internally consistent. Although Mr. Bassett was not present in the hearing room to hear 
Mr. Ewing's testimony, his testimony corroborated Mr. Ewing's version of events. The Commission 
therefore accepts the testimony of Mr. Ewing and Mr. Bassett regarding the events leading to Mr. 
Flemal's accident on April 16. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401 (1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides medical and 
disability benefits to employees injured "by accident arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment." The threshold issue in this case is whether, at the time of his accident on 
April 16, Mr. Flemal was still employed by Mr. Ewing so that his injuries can be said to arise "in the 
course" of that employment. 
In Walls v. Industrial Commission, 857 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah App. 1993), the Utah Court of 
Appeals noted that 
. . . an inj ury occurs in the course of employment when it takes place (1) within the period of 
employment, (2) at a place where the employee reasonably may be in the performance of [the 
employee's] duties, and (3) while [the employee] is fulfilling those duties or engaged in 
doing something incidental thereto. . . . Moreover, all three criteria of time, place and 
circumstances must be fulfilled in order for a claimant to recover workers' compensation 
benefits." 
(Citations and internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original.) 
In Walls, ibid, the individual seeking workers' compensation benefits had stayed at her place 
of employment for several hours after her shift had ended in order to socialize. The Court of 
Appeals observed that courts of other jurisdictions "have consistently held that employees who 
remain on the work premises following their employment for their own social purposes are not 
entitled to workers' compensation benefits." Walls at 968. While Mr. Flemal did not remain at the 
work site in this case for "social purposes," but was instead waiting for a ride home, the Commission 
does not view that difference as significant. The fact remains that Mr. Flemal's employment had 
ended. His subsequent actions, which resulted in his accident and injury, were not within the period 
of his employment and, consequently, were not in the course of his employment. Consequently, his 
injuries are not compensable under § 34A-2-401 (1) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ORDER REVERSING ALJ'S DECISION AND DENYING BENEFITS 
TODDFLEMAL 
PAGE 4 OF 5 
^ ORDER 
The Commission sets aside Judge Marlowe's award of benefits in this matter. The 
Commission concludes that Mr. Flemal's injuries did not arise in the course of his employment and 
for that reason are not compensable under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Mr. Flemal's 
claim for benefits is therefore dismissed. It is so ordered. 
Dated this / T ^ d a y of December, 2010. 
14 
Sherrie Haj<as{ii 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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Todd Flemal 
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Before Judges DAVIS, GREENWOOD, and ORME. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
DAVIS, Judge: 
*1 Petitioner Millard R. Crafts seeks review of a 
decision of the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) 
affirming a decision of a Commission Administrative Law 
Judge, which denied and dismissed Crafts's Applications 
for Hearing requesting permanent total disability 
compensation benefits from Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. 
(Yellow Freight) for an alleged industrial accident that 
occurred in 1997 (the 1997 incident). We affirm. 
Crafts argues that the Commission erred in denying 
his claim because (1) the signed and approved 
compensation agreement for permanent partial disability 
compensation (compensation agreement) he entered into 
with Yellow Freight is entitled to administrative finality 
status, permitting it to be final, appealable, and entitled to 
res judicata effect; and (2) he has satisfied the threshold 
requirement for a tentative finding of permanent total 
disability-that he was significantly impaired from the 1997 
incident. 
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We will overturn the Commission's factual findings 
only if they are "not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (2004). 
"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion." Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 
P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (quotations and citation 
omitted). "[T]his court will not substitute its judgment as 
between two reasonably conflicting views...." Id. "It is the 
province of the [Commission], not appellate courts, to 
resolve conflicting evidence, and where inconsistent 
inferences can be drawn from the same evidence, it is for 
the [Commission] to draw the inferences." Id. "When an 
agency has discretion to apply its factual findings to the 
law, we will not disturb the agency's application unless its 
determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Smith v. Mity Lite, 939 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citation omitted). 
Although, as Crafts notes, the Workers' 
Compensation Act (the Act), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 
34A-2-101 to -803 (2001 & Supp.2004), is to be construed 
"liberally and in favor of employee coverage when 
statutory terms reasonably admit of such a construction," 
Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 196 P. 2d 676, 679 (Utah 
1990), Crafts is not thereby relieved of the burden of 
proving that his injuries were caused by the 1997 incident. 
The Act provides that 
[t]o establish entitlement to permanent total disability 
compensation, the employee has the burden of proof to 
show by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or 
combination of impairments as a result of the industrial 
accident...; 
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and 
(iii) the industrial accident... was the direct cause of 
the employee's permanent total disability. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i)-(iii) (2001). 
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*2 Crafts argues that the executed compensation 
agreement conclusively establishes that he has a 3% 
permanent impairment resulting from the 1997 incident, 
and that Yellow Freight is barred by res judicata and \ 
estoppel from denying their previous stipulation to that 
effect. However, even assuming Crafts is correct on this 
point, and that the compensation agreement is conclusive 
as to the 3% impairment rather than merely being some 
evidence to that effect, with only a 3% permanent partial 
impairment Crafts has nonetheless failed to demonstrate 
that he "sustained a significant impairment or combination 
of impairments as a result of the industrial accident." Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(l)(b)(i) (emphasis added). Crafts, 
therefore, is not entitled to permanent total disability 
compensation from Yellow Freight. 
Even if we give the compensation agreement the legal 
effect Crafts urges, the Commission's determination that 
Crafts failed to provide sufficient evidence that he was 
significantly impaired as a result of the 1997 incident is 
unassailable. We decline to disturb the Commission's 
dismissal of Crafts's claim. 
WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD and 
GREGORY K.ORME. Judges. 
UtahApp.,2005. 
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